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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1192 
___________ 
 
EDVIN LEOPOLDO PEREZ CHINCHILLA, 
      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
       Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A205-016-427) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles K. Adkins-Blanch 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 20, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Edvin Leopoldo Perez Chinchilla (“Perez”) petitions for review of a decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals.  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
 In July 2006, Perez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without 
inspection.  On December 3, 2012, Perez was issued a notice to appear charging him with 
being removable as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or 
paroled.  Represented by counsel, he conceded removability and applied for asylum,1 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  He 
argued that he feared persecution based on his membership in a social group:  those who 
had refused recruitment by gangs.  
 After a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that the one encounter Perez 
had with the gangs in Guatemala did not rise to the level of past persecution.  Perez had 
testified that gang members had approached him to recruit him.  When he refused, he was 
told that he would likely be beaten or killed by the gang.  A.R. at 273.  The IJ declined to 
determine whether Perez belonged to a particular social group.  As for whether he had 
shown a likelihood of future persecution, the IJ determined that he did not demonstrate 
that he would be singled out or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of 
similarly-situated individuals.  The IJ noted that when Perez’s father was threatened, he 
                                              
1 Perez withdrew his application for asylum at the hearing because it was clear it was 
untimely.  A.R. at 286. 
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received protection from the police for several months.  The IJ also concluded that Perez 
had failed to establish that he would be targeted for torture. 
 Perez appealed and proceeded pro se before the BIA.  He also submitted additional 
evidence.  The BIA noted that the IJ found him removable based on his concession of 
removability.  It also observed that he had admitted that his asylum application was 
untimely.  Concluding that Perez had not shown a clear likelihood of persecution, the 
BIA declined to address whether Perez belonged to a particular social group.  It noted 
that there was only one threat to Perez’s life in 2006 and that the police had given 
protection to his father after the father was threatened in 2009.  A.R. at 2-3.  It 
determined that the police protection also undermined his claim for CAT relief.  The BIA 
concluded that Perez’s additional background evidence did not show that he would be 
singled out for persecution or torture, and it declined to remand the matter to the IJ for 
consideration of that evidence.  As for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
BIA noted that he had not complied with the procedural requirements of In re Lozada, 19 
I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and had not, and could not, show prejudice.  Perez filed a 
pro se petition for review. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Perez argues that the BIA incorrectly 
determined that his criminal convictions make him removable.  However, he was found 
removable not based on his conviction but because he was present in the United States 
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without being admitted or paroled.  Moreover, he conceded removability before the IJ.  
A.R. at 251. 
 We agree with the Government that several of Perez’s arguments were not 
exhausted before the BIA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (A court may review a final order 
of removal only if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the 
alien as of right”).  In his brief submitted to the BIA, Perez argued that his counsel was 
ineffective and that his conviction was for a crime he did not commit, but he did not 
address his eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT relief.2  Nevertheless, because 
the BIA addressed those issues, they are considered exhausted.  See Lin v. Attorney 
General, 543 F.3d 114, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, Perez needed to demonstrate 
that it was more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened in Guatemala 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 
(1984).  To be eligible for withholding of removal under the CAT, he needed to 
demonstrate that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to 
Guatemala.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  We may not reverse the BIA’s decision unless the 
record evidence would compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Perez had met his 
burden.  I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). 
                                              
2 He  also submitted several memoranda of law addressing irrelevant issues. 
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 In his brief, Perez argues that he demonstrated past persecution.  He asserts that he 
was threatened when he refused to join the MS-13 organization and saw his neighbor 
being killed because he refused to join.  Before the IJ, he testified that the neighbor was 
beaten after refusing recruitment.  A.R. at 274.  In an affidavit submitted with his 
application, Perez asserted that the neighbor refused recruitment and was so scared he left 
town.  The alleged killing of the neighbor was not presented to the IJ.  We may decide a 
petition for review based only on the administrative record.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(A).  Perez has not demonstrated that the single threat from the gang 
mentioned in his testimony compels a finding that it is more likely than not that his life or 
freedom will be threatened if he is removed to Guatemala.  See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 
483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Abusive treatment and harassment, while always 
deplorable, may not rise to the level of persecution.”); Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 
(3d Cir. 1993) (persecution denotes extreme conduct, including “threats to life, 
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to 
life or freedom”). 
 Perez challenges the BIA’s decision to not reach the issue of whether he belongs 
to a particular social group.  However, because Perez had not shown that his life or 
freedom would be threatened, the BIA did not need to determine whether Perez belonged 
to a particular social group.  Perez also challenges the IJ’s determination that he could 
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safely relocate within Guatemala; however, we see no such finding in the IJ’s opinion.  
The IJ merely noted Perez’s belief that it was not possible to relocate.  A.R. at 210. 
 Perez also contends that the BIA did not consider whether what would happen to 
him if he is removed to Guatemala would constitute torture.  However, the BIA did 
conclude that Perez had not shown he would be singled out for torture and noted that the 
police extended protection to Perez’s family.  Moreover, Perez does not point to any 
evidence in the record that would compel a finding that he would be tortured.  He does 
not address the IJ’s finding that the police gave his father protection. 
 In his reply brief, Perez argues that his prior counsel was ineffective and the BIA 
erred in failing to remand the matter for consideration of his new evidence.  However, he 
did not raise these arguments in his opening brief.  We will “not consider arguments 
raised on appeal for the first time in a reply brief.”  Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 
161 n.10 (3d Cir. 1998).  Moreover, he does not challenge the BIA’s determination that 
he had not complied with the procedural requirements of In re Lozada, and could not 
show prejudice.  He also cites several “material facts” but does not provide any record 
citation in support. 
 Perez has not shown that the record would compel a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that it is more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened or 
that he would be tortured if he is removed to Guatemala.  Accordingly, we will deny the 
petition for review.  Perez’s motion for the appointment of counsel and second motion to 
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stay removal are denied.  The Government’s motion for leave to file a supplemental 
appendix is granted.  
